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Letters

ing category of AF. This result was seen with MRI scans acquired at multiple participating centers worldwide with
differing procedural approaches and ablation techniques used.
Establishing a patient’s left atrial fibrosis burden offers one of
the few outcome determinants that could be used in the clinic
when counseling patients on whether they may benefit from
ablation therapy.
Drs Tops and Schalij raise questions related to the stage of
fibrosis and duration of fibrillation in patients with paroxysmal AF and their outcomes after ablation. Even though patients with paroxysmal AF have been considered to have less
advanced disease, the DECAAF results challenge the clinical
conventions used to assess left atrial disease. A significant number of patients with paroxysmal AF presented with advanced
atrial fibrosis stage.
Although establishing the onset and duration of AF remains challenging, in part due to the high percentage of patients with asymptomatic arrhythmia, AF duration reported
in DECAAF did not correlate with the degree of atrial fibrosis
(correlation coefficient, 0.02; P = .71). With delayed enhancement MRI, inferences about disease burden may no longer need
to rely solely on routine AF typing.
The association between atrial fibrosis and AF has been well
described in histological studies. Evidence validating left atrial
fibrosis quantification on MRI is mounting with compelling histological, electrical, and clinical data.1-3 Detection of myocardial injury and remodeling using delayed enhancement MRI
sequences is a well-validated technique dating back to the landmark histological study by Kim et al,4 which helped launch delayed enhancement MRI as the criterion standard for tissue viability testing.
We agree that patient selection criteria for AF ablation
should not be decided by any one parameter alone. Studies designed to improve understanding of the interplay between the
left atrial structural, functional, and electrophysiological processes that underlie AF are needed to advance the understanding of AF pathophysiology.
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Economic Incentives and Use
of the Intensive Care Unit
To the Editor Drs Gooch and Kahn1 pointed out an intriguing example of economic incentives driving widely varying intensive care unit (ICU) admission criteria. However, their concept of “demand elasticity” conflated 2 distinct economic
phenomena, normal demand and supplier-induced demand,
leading them to a draconian policy prescription.
In classic economics, consumers might demand care of
little benefit if they are insulated from the cost through
insurance, but they will never demand harmful care, such
as ICU care for patients with high-illness severity and low
survival in the conceptual model. Increased ICU bed availability could only cause increased harm in the presence of
supplier-induced demand; eg, when a clinician or hospital
system profits by advising a less-informed patient to consume services the patient would not want if he or she knew
all the facts.2
Demonstrating the existence of induced demand is controversial and requires cautious investigation of a change in
profitability, causing a change in the volume of care consumed.3
In addition, for demand to be induced, the evaluating physician must be concerned with the hospital's profit from maintaining full ICU capacity. Anecdotally, intensivists are often
frustrated by patient and family demands for futile care, which
argues against the induced-demand explanation.
Normal demand is sufficient to explain why admission criteria might vary according to bed availability. Appropriate patients benefit most from critical care; however, many patients admitted for observation still benefit, albeit to a lesser
degree. Compared with the relatively fixed costs of facilities
and salary, the additional costs of observing 1 more patient can
be low.
As long as the benefit exceeds the additional cost of filling an otherwise empty bed, ICU admission criteria should
change based on bed availability. The conceptual model depicted in the Viewpoint as pathological is actually an efficient
way to deliver high fixed-cost services, just as airlines vary their
prices to keep airplanes full.
Whether supplier-induced demand or normal demand
drives ICU use, it remains questionable whether beds are the
cause of high utilization rather than a symptom. It is more likely
that underlying high demand for ICU services causes both construction of many beds and the filling of those beds.
Therefore, the fault lies with a pricing system that does not
differentiate sufficiently between patients who benefit more
than the cost and those who do not. If necessary, paying less
for inappropriate patients and more for appropriate patients
would shift use away from less sick patients, causing more appropriate ICU usage without resorting to potentially harmful
bed quotas.
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In Reply We did not argue that ICU admission directly harms
patients with low illness severity. Our Viewpoint acknowledged a small potential benefit of close observation in the ICU
for these patients. Therefore, we did not use the term supplierinduced demand, which, as Mr Friedman correctly notes, implies but does not require a lack of marginal benefit.1 Instead,
we argued that this small potential benefit does not justify the
high costs of building and maintaining ICUs.
The idea that excess ICU bed supply leads to overuse is well
supported by data, both old2 and new.3 Friedman’s suggestion that current use patterns represent an efficient use of resources lacks the same evidentiary support. Moreover, although it is true that ICU beds carry high fixed costs, and
therefore the costs to individual patients are low, we did not
propose simply not admitting low-risk patients. We proposed
closing ICU beds and thus, substantially lowering fixed costs.
Friedman’s alternative solution of varying ICU prices based
on appropriateness is intriguing but impractical. It would require accurate and reliable assessment of ICU appropriateness, which is currently impossible4; and it would lead to explicit rationing by ability to pay, which is ethically untenable.5
Our solution is to trust the innate ability of physicians to perform safe implicit rationing in the setting of constrained
supply,6 maintaining quality while reducing the costs of care.
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CORRECTION
Omitted Author Affiliations: In the Original Investigation entitled “Radiofrequency Ablation vs Antiarrhythmic Drugs as First-Line Treatment of Paroxysmal
Atrial Fibrillation (RAAFT-2): A Randomized Trial” published in the February 19, 2014,
issue of JAMA (2014;311[7]:692-699. doi:10.1001/jama.2014.467), the author affiliations were omitted. This article was corrected online.
Incorrect Reference Citation: In the Health Agencies Update article entitled “More
Accurate Autism Screening,” published in the February 26, 2014, issue of JAMA
(2014;311[8]:791. doi:10.1001/jama.2014.1340), a reference was cited with the incorrect first author. The reference should have read Robins DL et al. Pediatrics. 2014;
133(1):37-45. This article has been corrected online.
Error in Title: In the Capitol Health Call article entitled “Where Medicare Health
Dollars Go,” published in the April 9, 2014, issue of JAMA (2014;311[14]:1389. doi:
10.1001/jama.2014.3710), the title referred to the incorrect program. The title should
have read, “Where Medicaid Health Dollars Go.” This article has been corrected online.
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